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NOTES
PURGING UNSEEMLY EXPLETIVES FROM THE PUBLIC SCENE:
A CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA
There can be no doubt that some expressions currently in vogue
among the radical elements of the populace do little to elevate public
discourse. At least one court has taken judicial notice that the current
language of dissent is offensive to many.' It is questionable, however,
whether such language constitutes disorderly conduct. Indeed, broad
disorderly conduct statutes are susceptible to discriminatory enforcement
against those whose ideas, language or physical appearance cause offense
to others.2 Perhaps it is only coincidental that during the last decade the
total number of disorderly conduct arrests rose 2.8 per cent while the
number of such arrests for persons under eighteen rose 66.3 per cent for
males and 99.5 per cent for females.' Whatever the ultimate reason,
however, the recent Supreme Court decision in Cohen v. California'
represents the latest in a series of constitutional attacks upon disorderly
conduct and related statutes' and their susceptibility to discriminatory
1. Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969), took judicial notice of the
use of the word "motherfucker" by young radicals and protestors from coast to coast.
Cf. Attorney General John Mitchell, in a major policy speech:
We cannot expect political demonstrations to be conducted like prayer meetings.
We must expect language which may incite hostility or may be obscene ...
The First Amendment protects all of us, including men and women who
choose to be unruly, unreasonable, or impolite.
Los Angeles Times, July 4, 1970, § 1, at 2, col. 4.
2. In Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), the Supreme Court struck
down a disorderly assembly ordinance, which provided in part:
It shall be unlawful for three or more persons to assemble . . . and

. . . conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.
CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES §901-L6 (1956)
Noting that "alleged discriminatory enforcement of this ordinance figured prominently in the background of the serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinati in June 1967" (402 U.S. at 616, n.6), the Court indicated also that anti-social
conduct could not be regulated by "an ordinance whose violation may entirely depend
upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed." 402 U. S. at 614.
3. 1970 FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, tables 24, 26.

4. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Wilson v. Gooding, 431
F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1970); Severson v. Duff, 322 F. Supp. 4 (M.D. Fla. 1970);
University Comm. to End the War in Viet Nam v. Gunn, 289 F. Supp. 469
(W.D. Tex. 1968), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 383 (1970); Hunter v. Allen, 286 F.
Supp. 830 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Baker v. Bindner, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967);
Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1967). See generally Amsterdam,
Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes of Statits, Crimes of
General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3
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enforcement. Cohen effectively points out the dangers of using prohibition
of particular words as a guise for suppression of unpopular views.
Section 415 of the California Penal Code states:
Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the peace
or quiet of any neighborhood or person, by loud or unusual
noise, or by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or threatening,
traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight, or fighting .
[shall be guilty of a misdemeanor] .'
In Cohen, the Supreme Court rejected the California Court of Appeals'
application of §415 in light of the constitutional limitations upon regulation of speech and made it clear that choice of words, as well as the
content of the message, may be protected under the first amendment.
Thus, the California court's interpretation of the statute as creating a
ban against the use of certain words' was rejected. Therefore, the conviction of Cohen for violating that per se rule by wearing a jacket bearing
the words "Fuck the Draft" in a court house corridor was reversed.
While the expression used was "perhaps more distasteful than most
others of its genre," 8 its use could not be prohibited on such a basis.
Consistent with the Court's expressed preference for speech which is
"uninhibited, robust, and wide open,"9 Cohen established that the first
amendment protects not only cognitive,"0 but also emotive' speech and
thus a state may not ban unseemly expletives from the public dialogue.
Clmu.L. BuLL. 205 (1967) ; Watts, Disorderly Conduct Statutes in Our Changing
Society, 9 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 349 (1967); Comment, Obscene Remarks to a Police
Officer: "Disorderly Conduct," "Disturbance," "Improper Diversion" or Poor Taste?,
45 MixW. L. REv. 137 (1960), commenting on St. Paul v. Morris, 258 Minn. 467, 104
N.W.2d 902 (1960); Comment, Wisconsin's Disorderly Conduct Statute: Why It
Should Be Changed, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 602; Note, Breach of the Peace and Disorderly
Conduct Laws: Void for Vagueness?, 12 How. L.J. 318 (1966).
6. CALuoRNIA PENAL ConE § 415 (West 1970).
7. The California Court of Appeals had found the word "fuck" inherently likely
to cause violence. People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1969).
8. 403 U.S. at 25.
9. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964).
10. The Court has often indicated that ideas, even if offensive, are protected.
Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611
(1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372

U.S. 229 (1963).
11. Additionally, we cannot overlook the fact, because it is well illustrated
by the episode involved here, that much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise,
detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. . . . We
cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive
content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function
which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the
overall message sought to be communicated.
403 U.S. at 25-26.
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Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Harlan began his analysis
by pointing out what was not at issue. Finding no identifiable conduct 2
and concluding, therefore, that the conviction must have rested solely on
Cohen's expression, the Court went on to find that none of the traditional
justifications for the regulation of speech were present. The California
statute was not directed toward preserving the decorum of a courthouse
but was applicable throughout the state and did not differentiate between
locations."3 The expression was not viewed as obscene, since it was not
erotic but merely vulgar." Upon examining the "fighting words" doctrine
of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire," the Court found it inapplicable.
Finally, the Court found no invasion of the privacy of captive hearers.'
Absent such justifications for state interference with free speech, the
Court narrowed the issue to whether the conclusion of the California
Court of Appeals that a particular word had a tendency to lead to violence
justified the imposition of a complete ban against that word.
In addition to criticizing the California statute because of its indiscriminate sweep,'" the Court recognized that the California court's
construction of the statute was similarly overbroad. The majority believed
that the application of a per se rule against the use of the word in
question created an irrebutable presumption that the word would cause
12. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien was convicted for the knowing destruction of a draft card. Since the statute did not distinguish
public from private destruction, nor punish destruction which was solely to express
one's views, the Court regarded it as directed to the non-communicative aspect of
such conduct. The statute was not directed in terms against expression, but against
conduct.
Cf. reversals by the Court in expression cases under disorderly conduct statutes
where convictions might have been sustained under narrower statutes regulating
picketing, demonstrating, blocking streets. Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970) ;
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) ; Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) ;
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
Might it make a difference whether legislators set out to make a law against
acts, which may sometimes be accomplished by words, or a law against the
words-a difference of constitutional dimension?
Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Re-examined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg
Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1175 (1970).
13. 403 U.S. at 19.
14. Id. at 20. Cohen would appear to dispose of such cases as State v. Leonard,
255 Iowa 1365, 124 N.W.2d 429 (1963), in which "son of a bitch" was held obscene on
the rationale that the word "bitch" implies a "hussy." The dissent pointed out the unlikelihood that the words "I'll punch you in the mouth, you son of a bitch" would appeal to
the average person's prurient interests. Id. at 1374, 124 N.W.2d at 435 (dissenting
opinion).
15. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
16. 403 U.S. at 22. The Court noted that the statute was not directed toward
protecting such hearers but applied indiscriminately to conduct that disturbed "any
neighborhood or person." Id. at 22.
17. Id.
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people to act violently. 8 However, rather than basing its decision either
upon the breadth of the statute or the California court's per se rule, the
Supreme Court chose to analyze other possible justifications for the conviction. The Court examined the possibility that the use of the word,
apart from the per se rule, actually did have a tendency to cause violence
or, alternatively, that a ban might be necessary for the maintenance of a
suitable level of public discourse.
In considering the tendency of Cohen's words to cause violence, the
Court, concluding that such a presumption was based on "undifferentiated
fear,"" found no evidence that
. . . substantial numbers of citizens are standing ready to strike

out physically at whoever may assault their sensibilities with
execrations.

.

.

. There may be some persons about with

such lawless and violent proclivities, but that is an insufficient
base upon which to erect . . . a governmental power to force

persons who wish to ventilate their dissident views into avoiding
particular forms of expression."0
Furthermore, the Court found that the argument was
.

.

.

little more than the self-defeating proposition that to

avoid physical censorship of one who has not sought to provoke such a response by a hypothetical coterie of the violent
and lawless, the States may more appropriately effectuate that
censorship themselves.
It regarded a subsequent "clear and present danger" construction of the
statute by the California Supreme Court 2 as insufficient justification
for remand since the new construction represented no difference of
substance.2"
Turning to the alleged necessity of maintaining a suitable level of
discourse, the Court examined the function of free expression in a
18. Id. at 23 n. 5.

19. Id. at 23.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. The statute was construed to require: . . . wilful and malicious conduct
that is violent and endangers public safety and order or that creates a clear
and present danger that others will engage in violence of that nature.
In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d 767, 773, 463 P.2d 727, 731, 83 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379 (1970).
23. 403 U.S. at 17 n. 2. Bushmnan was decided one month after the California
Supreme Court declined, over the objections of Chief Justice Traynor and Justices
Peters and Tobriner, to review Cohen. Bushman is evidently the first case in which
the California Supreme Court has construed the statute.
The Cohen dissent would have remanded Cohen for reconsideration in light of

Bieshian. Id. at 27-28.
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"diverse and populous" society 4 and noted that apparent discord and
tumult were unavoidable side effects of such freedom. In this context,
the Court weighed the dangers of banning particular words against the
social benefits to be gained from such a ban and declined to take the three
risks which it recognized: (1) the difficulty of distinguishing among
offensive words, (2) the possibility of censoring particular words as a
means of banning unpopular views and (3) the necessity of protecting
the emotive as well as the cognitive content of speech.
Concluding that the only arguably sustainable rationale for Cohen's
conviction, the necessity of maintaining a suitable level of discourse,
did not justify the complete ban imposed by the California court, the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction.
THE "FIGHTING WORDS" DOCTRINE AFTER "CO]HEN"

The Supreme Court's refusal to apply the "fighting words" doctrine
of Chaplinsky raises serious doubts as to the current limits of that

principle. Chaplinsky has been relied upon in various contexts to support
broad per se rules regulating other classes of speech25 in addition to
"fighting words," based on its dictum that:
• . . There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes

of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.2"
While Chaplinsky stated that punishment of obscenity, profanity and
libel raises no constitutional problems, subsequent cases have indicated
24. Id. at 24.
25. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity). Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Black, Douglas and Harlan dissented. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952) (criminal libel). Justices Black, Reed, Douglas and Jackson wrote
separate dissents.
26. 315 U.S. at 571-72. No case law is cited for this proposition. Z. CHAFEE,
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) is the only authority given. For the
narrower category of epithets and personal abuse, the Court cites Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). Again this is dictum since the conviction was reversed,
despite the fact that hearers were offended by Cantwell's attack on Catholics (one
felt "like hitting him" and another was "tempted to throw him off the street"), on the
ground that the effect on the hearers was not a breach of the peace.
The Chcplinsky language is sufficiently broad to suggest to at least one commentator a"split-level" theory of the first amendment:
There are two categories of speech-that entitled to First Amendment
scrutiny . . . and that so without importance or ideas that it is virtually
per se subject to regulation and raises no constitutional issues.
H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 46 (1965).
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that, in some circumstances, obscenity, 7 profanity 8 and libel 9 are not
per se beyond the protection of the first amendment. The Cohen decision
now indicates that the "fighting words" doctrine is narrower than the
dictum Chaplinsky had recognized.
While the majority in Cohen cited Chaplinsky with approval," they
found the Chaplinsky-related rationale of the California Court of Appeals
"plainly untenable."'" The Court distinguished Chaplinsky on the facts
by pointing out that Cohen's expression was not addressed to a particular
person, nor could anyone have reasonably regarded it as a personal
insult. Moreover, the Court stressed the state's failure to show either
that Cohen intended to arouse anyone to violence or that any person was
so aroused. 2
The Cohen decision, therefore, made it clear that the "fighting
words" doctrine is limited to situations in which such an expression is
addressed to a particular individual. Thus, as construed by the majority
in Cohen, Chaplinsky has no application to situations where members
of an audience are not personally insulted by the speaker but merely
dislike the views expressed or are antagonized by them. Such a result is
27.' Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), held a Georgia statute, insofar as
it made private possession of obscene matter a crime, unconstitutional under the first
and fourteenth amendments.
28. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), held that the motion
picture, "The Miracle," though deemed sacrilegious by the state of New York, was
entitled to the protection of the first amendment.
. 29. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Alabama Supreme
Court had relied on Beauharnair, Chaplinsky and Roth, inter alia, for the proposition
that libel is not protected by the first amendment. The United States Supreme Court
said:
[W]e are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give any more
weight to the epithet "libel" than we have to other "mere labels" of state
law. . . . Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of
the peace, obscenity . . . and the various other formulae for the repression
of expression . . . libel can claim no talismanic immunity from, constitutional
limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.
Id. at 269.
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), held that Sullivan limits state power
to impose criminal sanctions for criticism of official conduct of public officials.
It has been noted that the ancient justification given by the Star Chamber for the
punishment of criminal libel was on the same rationale as the "fighting words"
doctrine:
[F]or although the libel be made against one, yet it incites all of those
of the same family, kindred or society to revenge, and so tends per consequens
to quarrels and breach of the peace, and may be the cause of shedding of
blood, and of great inconvenience....
Note, Constitutionality of the Law of Criminal Libel, 52 COLum. L. Rxv. 521, 522
n.12 (1952), citing De Libellis Famosis, 77 Eng. Rep. 250, 251 (K.B. 1606).
30. 403 U.S. at 20.
31. Id. at 23.
A
32. Id. at 20.
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consistent with prior cases indicating that the first amendment does not
permit the power of a hostile audience to silence a speaker."
The approval of Chaplinsky does suggest that the state's prohibition
of "fighting words" directed to a particular person may retain some
immunity from first amendment scrutiny. However, much of the language
of Cohen appears to point the other way, at least where no intent to
provoke is shown. The distaste exhibited by the Court for the flat ban on
any particular word, the difficulties of distinguishing among offensive
words and the disinclination of the Court to believe that citizens will
retaliate with violence when their sensibilities are offended are considerations which appear equally applicable to the "fighting words"
doctrine. In any case, if the "fighting words" doctrine does retain any
vitality after Cohen, that case restricts its application to expressions
directed to, or perceived by, an "ordinary citizen. ' 34 The Court quoted
with approval" Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statement in another context
concerning public officials:
[O]ne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the
right to criticize public men and measures-and that means
not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to
speak foolishly and without moderation."3
This limitation of Chaplinsky to the "ordinary citizen," as opposed to
the "public man," is consistent with the logic of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan," and the Court seems to recognize that it would be inconsistent
to provide a qualified protection for those who libel public officials while
providing no protection whatever for those who slander them. However,
"ordinary citizen" is not defined.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF "COHEN"
Whited v. State' decided a few weeks before Cohen, involved a
33. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) ; Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S.
111 (1969) ; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
34. 403 U.S. at 20.
35. Id. at 26.
36. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-74 (1944).
37. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Sullivan indicated that uninhibited, robust and wide
open speech "may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials." Id. at 270.
38. Under the Cohen standard, it is doubtful whether Chaplinsky itself would
be decided in the same way today, for it was based on insults to public officials. Chaplinsky called a city marshal a "God damned racketeer" and a "damned Fascist" and
stated that the "whole government of Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists."
315 U.S. at 569. The Court found argument unnecessary to demonstrate that such epithets
would be likely to provoke the average person to violence. Id. at 574.
39. -Ind.-, 269 N.E.2d 149 (1971).
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disorderly conduct conviction in circumstances analagous to those in
Cohen. Although the conviction of Whited was affirmed by the Indiana
Supreme Court, the decision appears questionable in light of Cohen.
Whited, along with several friends, was on the porch of a house in
Indianapolis when police approached to make a search.40 Whited called
out, "Here come the damn pigs." When asked for identification, he
replied that he had done nothing, did not have "to say a god-damn
thing"41 and that the officer should "get his ass off the porch and stop
harassing" him." He was thereupon arrested for disorderly conduct.43
No testimony indicated that any of his remarks other than the first was
loud. All the persons on the porch were also arrested, along with members
of a crowd which had gathered.
While both the majority and dissent make it clear that Whited was
convicted solely for what he said rather than for his actions, the court
analyzed the case as one of conduct, 4 without deciding whether mere
40. As far as the record indicates, the police had no warrant for arrest or
search, nor was probable cause shown. The subsequent search turned up no evidence of
criminal activity. The order of arrival is not dear; there were, however, twelve
officers and five cars involved. The record is silent as to whether sirens or flashing
lights were used. Id. at-, 269 N.E.2d at 152, 153.
41. Brief for Appellee at 2.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2-3. Subsequent to his arrest, Whited's "tirade continued concerning
[an officer's] 'origination into the world' and so forth." Id. at 3.
44. The court used such language as: "appellant's conduct," "appellant's acts,"
"conduct on the porch," "conduct which by its nature is offensive," "Whited's actions,"
"accused's actions." -mInd. at-, 269 N.E.2d at 151; "unseemly actions," "appellant's
conduct," "the acts themselves," "tendency of appellant's actions." Id. at -, 269 N.E.
2d at 152.
The disorderly conduct statute under which Whited was convicted also looks
toward conduct:
Whoever shall act in a loud, boisterous or disorderly manner so as to
disturb the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or family, by loud or unusual
noise, or by tumultuous or offensive behavior, threatening, traducing, quarreling,
challenging to fight or fighting, shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct....
IND. CODE § 35-27-2-1 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-1510 (1956). The statute was
enacted in 1943 as a replacement for IND-.ANN. STAT. § 10-1509 (Supp. 1941), which
provided:
Whoever shall act in a loud, boisterous or disorderly manner in any
place either publicly or privately, or whoever shall act to the prejudice of
the good order of any community, shall be guilty of disorderly conduct.
Prior to 1941, Indiana had had no disorderly conduct statute and dealt with public*
offenses under specific statutes or ordinances, e.g., affray, provoking assault, picketing,,
profane swearing.
Cf. IND. CoDE § 35-1-80-1 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-1508 (1956), which
provides that the offense of disturbing a public meeting may be accomplished by
either words or acts: "loud or unnecessary talking, hallowing, or by any threatening,
abusive, profane or obscene language or violent actions. . . ." The maximum penalty
for violation of the statute is a fine of fifty dollars; no jail term is authorized. The
penalty for violating the disorderly conduct statute may be as much as 500 dollars
and 180 days.
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language is an "act" within the meaning of the statute.45 Quoting the
statute, the court found the requisite elements to be:
(1) act[ed] in a loud, boisterous manner
(2) so as to disturb the peace and quiet of the neighborhood."
The court noted that "a conviction would be proper if appellant's conduct
was such as to disturb the neighborhood, ' 47 thereby construing the statute
as having no element of intent. The fact that a crowd assembled had
evidentiary weight but was not required for conviction:
[O]nly a showing of conduct which by its nature is offensive
in the context . . . is required. ...

"

Whereas prior Indiana cases had indicated that an actual disturbance of
a neighborhood was required,4 9 the court in Whited made it clear that
45.

Cf. Commonwealth v. Jarrett, -Mass.-,

269 N.E2d 657, 662

(1971)

(dictum) :
The mere making of statements, or expressing of views or opinions,
no matter how unpopular, or views with which persons present do not agree,
has never been and is not now punishable as a disturbance of the peace under
the law of this Commonwealth.
46. -Ind. at -, 269 N.E.2d at 150 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at -, 269 N.E.2d at 151 (emphasis added). The court evidently viewed
"so as" in the statute as synonymous with "such as," reading it to mean a tendency
to produce a certain result. An equally plausible reading of "so as" is "in order to,"
that is, with the purpose of producing that result. Unless read in the latter way, the
statute is silent as to intent.
48. Id. at -, 269 N.E.2d at 151 (emphasis in original). On appeal, defense
counsel had argued that the police activity, not the defendant, had attracted the
crowd and that no evidence showed that persons other than the police were disturbed
or offended by anything the defendant said. Brief for Appellant at 9-10.
49. In Romary v. State, 223 Ind. 667, 64 N.E.2d 22 (1945), the affidavit had
been drawn under the requirements of the superseded statute (quoted in note 44
supra) and failed to allege a neighborhood disturbance. It fully described the acts;
however, it stated only that such acts were done "to the prejudice of the good order of
the community of Fort Wayne." In ruling on a motion in arrest of judgment, the court
indicated that while a defective indication of a material fact might render the indictment or affidavit insufficient on motion to quash, such a defect on motion to arrest
could be cured by evidence. Evidence that the events complained of occurred at 2:35
a.m., that the language was loud and profane and the conduct of four persons libidinous
and sensual, that many beer bottles were near the defendants, that the attention of
the police had been attracted from 300 feet away and that the police had stopped
at a lighted house and found a neighbor woman and her children awake warranted the
inference that the woman and her children had been disturbed.
The defendant in Morris v. State, 227 Ind. 630, 88 N.E.2d 328 (1949), appealed
his conviction for brawling in a tavern on the ground that a tavern was not within the
meaning of a "neighborhood or family." The court found that:
The word "neighborhood" as used in the disorderly conduct statute, includes
both residential and business sections. . . . A tavern is a part of a neighborhood as well as any other business to which the public is invited, and a disturbance, such as revealed by the evidence herein . . . was sufficient for the

court to find that the peace of the neighborhood was disturbed.
Id. at 632, 88 N.E.2d at 329.
Rexroat v. State, 245 Ind. 688, 201 N.E2d 558 (1964), the only other case to reach
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"offensiveness" did not refer to the disturbance of particular individuals,
but rather meant the nature of the conduct in terms of its potential for
disruption of the neighborhood."
The Whited court recognized that in speech-related cases the first
amendment requires that proscription be premised upon a tendency to
lead to violence. The court, therefore, advanced three points to support
the proposition that such a finding was "implicit in the trial court's
ruling."'" First, the court found that the additional arrests in the crowd
were evidence that Whited's acts "tended to increase the likelihood of
violence." 2 Secondly, the court found "equally persuasive in this regard"
Whited's "resistance" to what he should have assumed to be a valid
police activity." Thirdly, his acts were found to be "in concert" with
those of others on the porch."4
As to the first finding, the court apparently55 relied upon Bacheller
the supreme court under the statute, is ambiguous. The defendant was convicted of
entering to commit a felony, auto banditry and disorderly conduct Three witnesses
who lived near the scene of the crime testified as to the defendant's loud, belligerent
conduct after the police arrived and his refusal to cooperate until one officer drew a
revolver to secure compliance. Two witnesses also testified they had observed the
defendant and others ransack a house for seven minutes before the police arrived. It
is not clear what attracted the neighbor's attention to the house. A crowd of 15-20
assembled. The court did not discuss the element of actual disturbance of the neighborhood.
50. [I]t is the offensive nature of the conduct in terms of the neighborhood that violates the statute. The officers in this case are not the focal point
of the conviction. While they related the nature of the appellant's acts it was
the acts themselves and not those at whom they were directed that form the
basis of the conviction.
-Ind. at-, 269 N.E2d at 152 (emphasis in original). Apart from the problem of
measuring offensiveness in the absence of anyone who is offended, the standard atriculated by the Whited court took no account of variations in the sensibilities of different groups, nor did it distinguish among recipients.
51. Id. at -, 269 N.E.2d at 152.
52. Id. at -, 269 N.E.2d at 152. There is no indication in the record whether the
arrests in the crowd were for language or for acts.
53. Id. at -, 269 N.E.2d at 152. Why the defendant should have "assumed" the
police were acting lawfully is not clear. In fact, they were not, as the dissent points out.
They had neither warrant nor apparent probable cause for a search, and without the
consent of the householder to search stood in no better position than trespassers. Id.
at -, 269 N.E2d at 156.
54. Id. at -, 269 N.E.2d at 152. It is not clear whether "in concert" suggests
some kind of plan or merely that others also used offensive language. The recital of
facts makes it clear that the raid was a surprise to the defendant and his companions
and that their exclamations were spontaneous.
55. The point appears to derive from the state's brief. The state's case was
based on the proposition that "foul, vulgar and obscene!' language to a police officer
is per se disorderly conduct. Additionally, the state alleged:
It has been held that the gist of the offense . . . is the doing or saying or
both of that which offends, disturbs, or incites a number of people gathered
in the same area. Bacheller [sic] v. State, 3 Md. App. 626, 240 A.2d 623
(1968).

.

.

. Since members of the gathering crowd were arrested for dis-

orderly conduct as Whited hurled his foul, vulgar, and obscene epithets, it
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[sic] v. State, 6 a case which had already been reversed by the United
States Supreme Court." Insofar as that conviction might have been based
either upon the bystanders' general disapproval of demonstrations or
their anger at the petitioners' particular views, the Court stated:
It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas
are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.58
Unfortunately, the Indiana court gives no explanation of how the last
two points relate to the possibility of violence.
Whited is subject to many of the same criticisms that the Supreme
Court found in the state court's treatment of Cohen. Although no separately identifiable conduct was mentioned, conduct was apparently presumed. If there was a basis for identifying Whited's words as conduct,
the court should have revealed it. Absent such an explanation, Whited's
conviction, like Cohen's, rests solely upon speech. In addition, the Indiana
statute suffers from the same indiscriminate sweep criticized by the
Cohen Court. It is directed neither toward the protection of particular
places, such as courthouses, nor toward particularly situated hearers, such
as a captive audience. 'Moreover, the Indiana statute, unlike California's,
has no element of intent, an infirmity indicated by the Whited court's
failure to suggest such a requirement in its construction of the statute."
can reasonably be inferred that they were disturbed and incited by Whited
to such an extent that they were arrested for disorderly conduct.
Brief for Appellee at 13-14.
56. 3 Md. App. 626, 240 A.2d 623 (1968).
57. Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970). The conviction might have
rested on a finding that the defendants obstructed passage and refused to obey a
police command to move when their refusal could have endangered public peace.
However, it might also have rested on the ground on which the trial judge instructed
the jury in the quoted language. Because a conviction based on such an instruction would
have been unconstitutional, the United States Supreme Court reversed.
58. Id. at 567.
59. In contrast, the General Assembly paid due attention to intent when enacting
the following criminal provisions during its last session:
. . . It shall be unlawful for any person intentionally to . . .engage in any
violent conduct with the intent to prevent any peace officer . . . from the
performance of his duty . . . when such conduct does in fact substantially
hinder or prevent performance of said duty ...
Pub. L. No. 450, § 1, [1971] Ind. Acts 2081, amending IND. CODE § 35-1-77-1 (1971),
IND. ANN. STAT.

§ 10-1505 (1956).

A person is guilty of inciting riot if he wilfully incites a group of five
(5) or more persons to engage in a riot and said persons thereafter do in
fact engage in a riot as a result of such incitement.
Pub. L. No. 450, § 4 [1971] Ind. Acts 2082.
Both offenses require specific intent and an actual result, not merely a tendency.
The first statute requires, additionally, violent conduct. It is anomolous in view of the
genuine substantive evil of civil disorder that the court allows invocation of the police
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The analysis applied by the Indiana Supreme Court is also inconsistent with the Cohen interpretation of the "fighting words" doctrine.
The court specifically refused to focus on the reaction of the police or of
any other individual to whom the expression might have been addressed.
In light of Cohen's interpretation of Chaplinsky, "fighting words" may
only be prohibited when directed to a particular individual.6"
Absent the traditional justifications for such regulation of speech,
it is appropriate to ask, as the Court did in Cohen, whether the state of
Indiana may constitutionally punish Whited's outburst as either tending
to lead to violence or unjustifiably lowering the acceptable level of public
discourse. As in Cohen, there was no indication that Whited intended to
arouse anyone to violence or that anyone was, in fact, so aroused. Moreover, in view of Cohen's refusal to distinguish between "tendency to
lead to violence" and "clear and present danger," the conviction in
Whited appears even more unsupportable by evidence. Apart from the
arrests in the crowd (the reason for which appears nowhere in the
record) there was no evidence that Whited's remarks tended to lead to
violence or constituted a "clear and present danger."
It would appear, therefore, that there was no justification, traditional
or otherwise, for the conviction in Whited. Instead, the opinion suggests
that the court may have been reacting to more than Whited's single use
of the word "pigs" when it characterized that use as "freely employing
colloquial terminology used by a minority of our citizens to refer to
officers of the law."'" Cohen should prevent future convictions on such a
basis.
CONCLUSION

Cohen does suggest legitimate state interests which may justify
regulation of speech. Such interests include regulation of separate nonspeech elements, of obscenity or of personal insults likely to provoke
assault and the protection of particular locations or personal privacy
rights. In order for this regulation to satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution, however, statutes must be more narrowly construed than
the California Court of Appeals was willing to do in Cohen, and a
fortiori, more narrowly than the Indiana Supreme Court construed the
statute in Whited. The United States Supreme Court has made it clear
that no statutory construction as broad as that attempted in California
power to prevent "tendencies" to less serious disturbances on a considerably lower standard.
60. See text accompanying notes 32-33 .ipra.
61. -Ind. at-, 269 N.E. 2d at 150-51.
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and accomplished in Indiana can be justified as making valid discriminations between different persons and different places.
A speaker may incite others to violence in either of two ways. First,
he may advocate, encourage or counsel others to commit violent acts. 62
Secondly, he may so offend others by his ideas or language that they are
provoked to violence against him." Cohen suggests, in broad dictum,
that at least in the latter case, a speaker may be silenced only upon a
showing of the audience's countervailing constitutional right not to listen:
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to
shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is
dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.
Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower
a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal
predilections. "4
Absent a showing of interference with such privacy rights, the result
in Whited appears unsupportable under a Cohen-type analysis. Whited
was not only impolite but impolitic. His denunciation of the police, 5
however, would appear as deserving of protection as a denunciation of
62. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
63. See, e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
64. 403 U.S. at 21.
65. The cases are divided as to whether language addressed to the police can be
the ground for a charge of disorderly conduct. Among the cases holding in the affirmative are: Landry v. Daley, 288 F. Supp. 183 (N.D. Ill. 1968), appeal dimnissed,
393 U.S. 220 (1968); Duncan v. United States, 219 A.2d 110 (D.C. App. 1966); St.
Paul v. Morris, 258 Minn. 467, 104 N.W.2d 902 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 815
(1961). Contra, Oratowski v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 3 Ill. App. 2d 551, 123 N.E.2d 146
(1954) (dictum); Columbus v. Guidotti, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 33, 160 N.E.2d 355 (1958);
Lane v. Collins, 29 Wis. 2d 66, 138 N.W.2d 264 (1965). See also dissenting opinion of
Judge Hammond in Sharpe v. State, 231 Md. 401, 190 A.2d 628 (1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 946 (1963):
. . . Sharpe was foolish and boorish; and his reaction to being pushed around,
as he saw it, should have been restrained, as should his use of profanity which
was ill advised, unattractive and an empty substitute for thought, as it usually
is. In this case it brought him only a severe beating by the two officers, arrest,
and conviction.
The officer's impolitic conduct should not have produced Sharpe's discourtesy or arrogance in return, but while discourtesy or arrogance to a
policeman may infuriate him, and so are unwise to indulge in, they are not
crimes which the policeman may translate into disorderly conduct in order
to vent his annoyance by making an arrest.
Id. at 408, 190 A.2d at 632-33. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.1, Comment 4 (c), at 14
(Tent Draft No. 13, 1961) :
Insofar as the theory of disorderly conduct rests on the tendency of the
actor's behavior to provoke violence in others, one must suppose that policemen employed and trained to maintain order, would be least likely to be
provoked by disorderly responses.
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the Selective Service System, 6 the American flag
the United States."

7

or the President of

Cohen, however, has its own inherent ambiguity. It is difficult to
reconcile the decision's concern with distinguishing among differently
situated recipients with its suggestion that there is a single set of
"personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary
citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to
provoke violent reaction." 9 Given the diversity of sensibility and linguistic expression among ethnic, cultural, religious, racial, class and age
groups in our heterogeneous society, the difficulty of applying a standard
70
involving "common knowledge" of the reactions of "ordinary citizens"
seems insurmountable. As justice Loevinger of the Minnesota Supreme
Court has pointed out:
[I]t is quite impossible to determine how offensive any particular expression is. To begin with, curses, oaths, expletives,
execrations, imprecations, maledictions, and the whole vocabu66.
67.

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
[T]he "right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing
order," encompass[es] the freedom to express publicly one's opinions about
our flag, including those opinions which are defiant or contemptuous.
Id. at 593.
68. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). Watts was charged with a
felony for threatening the President. During a rally he had said, "If they ever make
me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L. B. J." The Court regarded the statement as political hyperbole, a "crude offensive method of stating a
political opposition. . . ." Id. at 708. The Court also noted that "[tihe language of the
political arena, like the language used in labor disputes . . . is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact." Id.
69. 403 U.S. at 20.
70. A construction was recently put on the New Jersey Disorderly Person Act,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-29(1), requiring that words be intended to offend and, in
view of the sex and age of the listener and other circumstances, be likely to do so.
Under this standard, the Nev Jersey Supreme Court reversed two convictions for
arguing with policemen: State v. Profaci, 56 N.J. 346, 266 A.2d 579 (1970) ("What
the f[sic] are you bothering me for?") and State v. Reed, 56 N.J. 354, 266 A2d
584 (1970) ("[W]ho the hell do you think you are? . . . Jesus Christ. I don't give
a God damn who the hell you are.").
In discussing the allegation of overbreadth, the court in Profacisaid:
[T]he resolution of this issue depends upon whether the statute permits
police and other officials to wield unlimited discretionary powers in its enforcement. If the scope of the power permitted these officials is so broad that the
exercise of constitutionally protected conduct depends on their own subjective
views as to the propriety of the conduct, the statute is unconstitutional.
56 NJ. at 350, 266 A2d at 582, quoting Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D.
111 1968).
A federal court had previously construed the New Jersey statute in another context
to exclude spontaneous and casual profanity from its ambit. Karp v. Collins, 310 F.
Supp. 627 (D.N.J. 1970).
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lary of insults are not intended or susceptible of literal interpretation. They are expressions of annoyance and hostilitynothing more. To attach greater significance to them is stupid,
ignorant, or naive. Their significance is emotional, and it is not
merely immensurable but also variable. .

.

. The standards of

verbal behavior of those social groups within which judges
move are not fairly applicable to the entire population. 7
ELLEN

K. THOMAS

71. St. Paul v. Morris, 258 Minn. 467, 480-81, 104 N.W.2d 902, 910-11 (1960)
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 815 (1961).

